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Abstract
Focusing on the rise of the behavioural sciences within the design and implementation of public policy, this
paper introduces the concept of neuroliberalism and suggests that it could offer a creative context within
which to interpret related governmental developments. Understanding neuroliberalism as a system of
government that targets the more-than-rational aspects of human behaviour, this paper considers the
particular contribution that geographical theories of context and spatial representation can make to a critical
analysis of this evolving governmental project
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I Introduction: Geography and
neuroliberal government
The insights of the behavioural sciences have
long been complicit within the acts of modern
government (see Foucault, 2008 [2004]; Met-
tler, 2011; Nolan, 1998; Rose, 1985, 1998). As
a result of the emergence of behavioural
economics, the last ten years have seen a con-
spicuous increase in the relative influence of
these sciences within public policy-making
(see Oliver, 2013a, 2017; Mettler, 2011; Shafir,
2013; Sunstein, 2013; World Bank, 2015;
World Economic Forum, 2018: 56–7). In this
regard, the UK has been in the behavioural
vanguard. After coming to power in 2010, the
UK’s Coalition Government instigated a sys-
tematic engagement with behavioural forms of
intervention and established a Behavioural
Insights Team (Behavioural Insights Team,
2011a, 2011b; Halpern, 2015; Hilton, 2015; see
John et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2013). But these
behavioural developments have not been
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confined to the UK. The Australian govern-
ment’s Public Service Commission (2007) has
been actively promoting the use of behavioural
psychology within the design of public policy.
In the USA, the Obama administration estab-
lished the White House Social and Behavioral
Sciences Team, which worked with various
federal agencies to explore the effective appli-
cation of behavioural insights within public
policy design.1 Meanwhile countries as diverse
as the Netherlands, Germany, Japan, Canada,
Singapore, Guatemala, and Lebanon have all
been active in the development of public poli-
cies that are informed by the behavioural
sciences. At an international level, organiza-
tions including the European Commission,
UNICEF, the World Bank, the OECD,
EuropeAid, the World Economic Forum, and
USAID are utilizing the insights of the beha-
vioural sciences to address issues as diverse as
loan repayments, fertilizer use, HIV/AIDS, and
a range of public health and hygiene initiatives
(see European Commission, 2013; Lunn, 2014;
OECD, 2017; World Bank, 2015). In this paper,
we propose a critical framework within which
to analyse these governmental developments
and consider the particular contributions that
geographers can make to this project.
The contemporary mobilization of the beha-
vioural sciences within the practices of govern-
ment is routinely described through the
technical nomenclature of behaviour change,
or behavioural insights. Critical analyses have
attempted to interpret related strategies through
the notion of the submerged state (Mettler,
2011), or psychologically rebooted systems of
governmentality (Jones et al., 2011). In this
paper, we argue that the concept of neuroliber-
alism provides an alternative perspective
through which to situate and critically analyse
these novel modalities of behavioural govern-
ment. We claim that while supporting critical
interpretations of emerging forms of beha-
vioural government, neuroliberalism can signal
a move beyond relatively narrow concerns over
the manipulative nature of related forms of
power (as with accounts of the submerged
state), while reworking the established assump-
tions of human subjectivity that undergird the-
ories of governmentality.
Engin Isin (2004) was the first to suggest the
concept of neuroliberalism. For Isin, neuroliber-
alism is ‘[a] rationality of government that takes
its subject as the “neurotic citizen” and involves
an orchestrated attempt to “govern through neu-
rosis”.’ Isin developed the concept of neuroli-
beralism as a response to work on neoliberal
governmentality (see Dean, 1999; Rose, 1999)
that emphasized the subjective capacities of
self-reflection, calculation and rationality
(Greco and Stenner, 2013).2 For Isin, neuroli-
beralism was important to the extent that it drew
attention to the orchestration of emotions,
desires and affects within the establishment of
governmental power. While inspired by the
work of Isin, our use and interpretation of neu-
roliberalism is a particular one. For us, neuroli-
beralism denotes systems of government that
are primarily characterized by the mobilization
of novel cognitive strategies, emotions, and pre-
cognitive affects as a way of securing preferred
forms of social conduct while ostensibly sup-
porting liberal orthodoxies of freedom.
We thus utilize the concept of neuroliberal-
ism to describe the increasing capacity of states,
corporations, and non-governmental organiza-
tions to govern through a series of more-than-
rational registers of human action (including
habits, heuristics, emotions, affects, and social
and environmental contexts), and to skilfully
fuse behavioural power with liberal notions of
freedom. Critically, in this paper we do not see
neuroliberalism as an ontological replacement
of neoliberal government. Instead we are con-
cerned with the varied ways in which neuropo-
litical developments shadow and interconnect
with neoliberalism. In these contexts, we sug-
gest that neuroliberalism embodies three dimen-
sions: (1) a series of new scientific and
intellectual perspectives on the nature of the
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human condition and how people should be
governed; (2) an emerging, if still incoherent,
set of government practices that connect beha-
vioural power and liberalism; and (3) a context
through which to analyse behaviourally
informed styles of liberal government.
We believe that neuroliberalism provides a
framework for connecting together and evaluat-
ing the cumulative impacts of the behavioural,
psychological, and neuro sciences on the gov-
ernmental targeting of more-than-rational life.
In this paper, we focus primarily on a particular
aspect of neuroliberalism, namely the impacts
of behavioural economics on public policy.
Behavioural economics reflects a creative
fusion between cognitive psychology and eco-
nomics, which has challenged many of the core
assumptions of rationality associated with neo-
classical economic thinking (Berndt, 2015).
While representing only one expression of neu-
roliberalism, behavioural economics has argu-
ably been the most influential school of new
behavioural thinking when it comes to actually
existing governmental policy.
In addition to introducing the concept of neu-
roliberalism, a central aim of this paper is to
explore the contributions that geographical
scholarship can make to the area of inquiry neu-
roliberal government defines. The behavioural
questions raised by the idea of neuroliberalism
are directly, but often disjointedly, addressed
within a broad swathe of existing geographical
scholarship (see Avineri, 2012; Barr and Prill-
witz, 2013; Berndt, 2015; Boeckler and Berndt,
2012; Carter, 2015; Gill and Gill, 2012; Jones
et al., 2011, 2013; Pykett et al., 2011; Strauss,
2008, 2009; Whitehead et al., 2011). Drawing
on this body of scholarship, we argue that an
important dimension of any critical theory of
neuroliberalism is an appreciation of its spatial
parameters and assumptions. In particular, this
paper reflects on the contribution that geogra-
phical scholarship can make to two important, if
often overlooked, aspects of neuroliberalism:
(1) the spatial qualities of behavioural context;
and (2) geographical representations of irra-
tionality. Focusing on these two perspectives,
this paper uncovers key geographical contradic-
tions and limitations that characterize
neuroliberalism.
This paper commences by unpacking the idea
of neuroliberalism. The second part of this
paper explores the question of behavioural con-
text in relation to placed-based attempts to
improve public health. The third section focuses
on the application of neuroliberalism within
international development policies and the pro-
blematic representations of irrationality this
involves. The discussion in this paper has been
informed by extensive documentary research
and over 100 interviews conducted with
policy-makers, academics, and other parties
associated with the use of behavioural insights
throughout the public, private and non-
governmental sectors over a nine-year period.3
II On neuroliberal government
Neuroliberalism is best thought of in three inter-
connected ways: as a theory of human subjec-
tivity and action; as an ontological expression of
emerging government forms; and as a context
for analysing emerging systems of behavioural
government. We recognize that the suggested
multi-dimensional forms of neuroliberalism
could lead to the obfuscation of the term and
promiscuity in its application (see Clark,
2008). The dangers of obfuscation are, within
our estimations at least, worth the risk. We
claim that thinking of neuroliberalism in these
multi-dimensional ways enables the simulta-
neous identification, association, and critical
analysis of a series of disparate, but connected,
governmental developments. This section out-
lines the different forms of neuroliberalism in
turn.
1 Neuroliberalism I: Theoretical project
Put most simply, neuroliberalism is a form of
behavioural government that is predicated upon
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novel theories of human subjectivity and action
that challenge neoliberal orthodoxies. Neolib-
eral systems of government are based upon
visions of human behaviour that assume rational
traits of motivation and action (see Becker,
1962). The so-called rationality assumption that
sustains the neoliberal project asserts that peo-
ple act on the basis of deliberative calculation
and in the contexts of relative social isolation
and self-interest (see Cohen, 2014). The pre-
sumption of rational human behaviour is sine
qua non to the optimal allocation of resources
and the avoidance of economic collusion, which
are central to the neoliberal vision of society
(Friedman, 2002). While recognized as a highly
idealized interpretation of human behaviour, the
rationality assumption is still seen by many to
offer a close enough approximation of aggre-
gate social conduct to be able to justify and
support neoliberal systems of government (cf.
Thaler, 2015). Two processes have served to
undermine the necessary myth of human ration-
ality upon which neoliberalism rests. The first
are a series of emerging studies at the interface
of psychology and economics (this interdisci-
plinary space is now commonly referred to as
behavioural economics; Heukelom, 2011, 2012;
Oliver, 2013a, 2017; Sent, 2014). Second are a
number of real-world crises that exposed the
fallacious behavioural assumptions of
neoliberalism.
The first concerted challenge to the rational-
ity assumption emerged out of the pioneering
work on human decision-making by the poly-
math Herbert Simon. Simon challenged the pre-
sumption of rational action through the
principle of bounded rationality. According to
Simon, the bounding of human rationality was
the product of both limited human cognitive
capacities, and the fact that the real-world con-
texts in which we live rarely furnish us with the
information we need to make optimal decisions
(Simon, 1957). The early theoretical work of
Herbert Simon was advanced during the 1970s
and 80s by a group of psychologists and
economists who were interested in the empirical
foundations of economic decision-making. The
most prominent members of this new thought
collective were Daniel Kahnemen, Amos
Tversky and Richard Thaler (Lewis, 2016; Sent,
2014; Thaler, 2015). Together these writers
would help to lay the foundations for the field
of behavioural economic study (see Sent, 2014).
Behavioural economics challenges neo-
classical economic theory on the basis of its
presumption of rationality, and because of its
collective neglect of empirical studies into actu-
ally existing human behaviours (Oliver, 2013a:
7; Strauss, 2008, 2009). Through empirical
studies of economic decision-making in a range
of contexts, behavioural economists demon-
strated consistent deviations from the beha-
viours expected within neoclassical economic
orthodoxy (Kahneman, 2012; Kahneman et al.,
1982; Thaler, 2015; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).
These deviant behaviours generally include a
tendency to follow the social herd; to prefer
status quo to behavioural change; and to prior-
itize present over future needs (John et al.,
2011). These systematic behavioural patterns
were often acknowledged within economic the-
ory but dismissed as ‘true but unimportant’ or
‘supposedly irrelevant factors’ (SIFs) (see Tha-
ler, 2015). Over time, however, behavioural
economists have provided ever more detailed
studies of these cognitive biases and beha-
vioural heuristics, which have made them diffi-
cult to ignore.
If behavioural economics provided a key sci-
entific basis for neuroliberalism, its populariza-
tion was clearly driven by a series of
interconnected crises of neoliberal society. Cen-
tral among these crises was the Credit Crunch of
2008, and subsequent Great Recession (Akerlof
and Schiller, 2010). According to Akerlof and
Schiller, the Sub Prime Crisis and Credit
Crunch embodied the global aggregation of the
irrational behaviours (particularly the misappre-
hension of risk) that behavioural economists
had been describing for two decades (see also
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Deutsche Bank, 2010; Boeckler and Berndt,
2012). Given that neoliberal theory could not
account for its own failings, increasing credence
was given to the notion that the crisis could be a
product of the supposedly irrelevant beha-
vioural factors it had routinely ignored. Follow-
ing neuroliberal interpretations of the economic
crises of neoliberalism, a series of problems
within neoliberal society are now being read
in similar behavioural terms. It is now, conse-
quently, common to see climate change (Mar-
shall, 2015), obesity (De Ridder et al., 2013),
gambling (Gobet and Schiller, 2014), and global
poverty (Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013; World
Bank, 2015) being explained through the
sciences of neuroliberalism (Leggett, 2014).
It is our contention in this paper that neuro-
liberalism has emerged as both a scientific
rebuke to the assumptions of neoliberal eco-
nomic thinking and a set of practical responses
to its observed crises. We assert, however, that
far from being a rejection of neoliberal thinking,
neuroliberalism embodies a creative adaptation
of the market-oriented norms of neoliberalism.
Moreover, we claim that the geographical
assumptions of neuroliberalism are central to its
ability to simultaneously critique and re-
valorize market-oriented systems of govern-
ment and behaviour. Before we explore this
point further, it is necessary to outline the prac-
tical forms and manifestations of neuroliberal-
ism as an actually existing system of
government.
2 Neuroliberalism II: Government practice
If the scientific foundations of neuroliberalism
can be located in behavioural economics, its
practical inspirations derive from the principles
of libertarian paternalism (or nudge, as it is
commonly known) (see Thaler and Sunstein,
2008; Sunstein, 2014). Libertarian paternalism
has two primary components. Its paternalist
instincts are based upon the behavioural eco-
nomic insights that humans often act irrationally
against their own best interests and therefore
require certain forms of support in decision-
making processes. It is libertarian to the extent
that it seeks to ensure that an individual’s free-
dom (usually expressed in their right to choose)
is not undermined by behavioural government
(Sunstein, 2014). To put things another way,
libertarian paternalism embodies a practical
expression of neuroliberal government to the
extent that it acknowledges (and exploits)
human irrationality to serve collective beha-
vioural goals (its neuro-logical component),
while seeking to preserve aspects of human
autonomy (its liberal aspect).
As a governmental project, libertarian
paternalism has three key tropes: its targets
(including emotions, habits, automatic forms
of decision-making, and social norms inter
alia); its vectors of operation (for example,
peer-networks, choice environments, anchor-
ing, data framing, and contagion); and its meth-
odologies of evaluation (including randomized
control trials, sentiment analysis, and non-
critical audit). These tropes come together in
a range of initiatives, which seek to reshape the
choice environments that shape people’s every-
day life, in order to make it easier for people to
make decisions that support purportedly more
healthy, financially secure, and environmen-
tally sustainable lives (Thaler and Sunstein,
2008). The second half of this paper will con-
sider precisely what related neuroliberal strate-
gies involve through a discussion of two policy
areas: public health and international develop-
ment. At this point, however, it is pertinent to
observe that neuroliberal policies have been
employed in a broad range of public policy
areas (see Behavioural insights Team, 2011a,
2011b, 2012; Social and Behavioural Sciences
Team, 2016).
While neuroliberalism has been associated
with the reshaping of the forms and functions
of key areas of front line public policy, it
has also offered a framework for evaluating
government actions and failures in back office
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operations within the deep state (see Galley
et al., 2013; World Bank, 2015). The Canadian
government and theWorld Bank have both con-
sidered the different ways in which the scientific
insights associated with neuroliberalism could
be used to combat predictable forms of irration-
ality and error exhibited by governmental per-
sonnel (Galley et al., 2013; World Bank, 2015).
In more concrete terms, Oliver (2013b) has sug-
gested that neuroliberal insights could be used
to better understand and correct governmental
overreaction to crises. In his analysis of the UK
government’s response to the Swine Flu pan-
demic, for example, Oliver suggests that the
‘overreaction’ that was observed (and which
saw the National Health Service spend £1.2 bil-
lion (1% of its total annual budget) on preven-
tion treatment) was a product of ambiguity
aversion: a psychological tendency to overesti-
mate the impacts of things that have a signifi-
cant amount of uncertainty surrounding them
(2013b: 16–31).
3 Neuroliberalism III: Towards a critical
framework
In addition to acting as a reference point for new
theories of human subjectivity and government
practice, we argue that neuroliberalism could
offer a basis to develop a critical theory of emer-
ging processes of behavioural government.
When we speak of a critical theory of neuroli-
beralism we are referring to something analyti-
cally specific. A specifically critical theory of
neuroliberalism could offer three important ana-
lytical perspectives on emerging systems of
behavioural government: (1) an interdisciplin-
ary perspective; (2) an abstract orientation (with
a particular concern with identifying contradic-
tions in totalizing governmental practices); and
(3) a focus on how things could be different
(Brenner, 2009). It may seem strange to talk
of a critical theory of neuroliberalism as being
interdisciplinary, given that the neuroliberal
project is already an inherently interdisciplinary
affair. In keeping with critical studies more gen-
erally, however, a critical theory of neuroliber-
alism would entail a form of interdisciplinarity
that moves beyond the predominantly techno-
cratic and positivist zones of the psychological
and design sciences. It is a form of interdiscipli-
narity that combines positivist questions of effi-
cacy with broader metaphysical questions of
purpose and ethics. More specifically – and as
we argue below – it is an interdisciplinary proj-
ect that would benefit in very specific ways
from an engagement with key concerns within
human geography, and the interdisciplinarity
that is itself evident within the discipline of
geography.
A critical theory of neuroliberalism would
also entail a decidedly abstract form of analyti-
cal orientation. The abstract orientation of a crit-
ical theory of neuroliberalism is important
because it interrupts the narrow empiricism that
characterizes much of the science and practices
of contemporary behavioural government. As
with neoliberalism, neuroliberal government
appears set on establishing what Davis has
referred to as a political physics which ‘seeks
to replace moral rules [ . . . ] with scientific rules
[ . . . ] shift[ing] questions of normativity else-
where, into the spheres of expert procedure and
methodology’ (2014: 15). This is a brand of
empiricism that denies the existence of that
which cannot be measured in the quantitative
moment of the psychological and economic
sciences. Denying the metaphysical context
within which behavioural government is con-
ducted closes off key moral debates and reduces
the scope within which it is possible to discern
the role of non-local forces in shaping observed
behavioural patterns (this is an issue we return
to in our discussion of behavioural context
below).
The final key dimension of a critical theory of
neuroliberalism is the emphasis it brings to the
contingency of the present – or how things could
be different. While contingency may be a
common theme within many branches of
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contemporary social sciences, the sciences and
practices of neuroliberalism appear to leave
only limited scope to explore the malleability
of the present. While neuroliberalism is clearly
predicated on a project of change, this change is
limited in two key ways. First, neuroliberalism
often operates in denial of the opportunity that
individuals have to shape their own behavioural
destiny in creative and empowering ways. Sec-
ond, as a set of scientific and government prac-
tices neuroliberalism is an exceptionally
conformist project to the extent that it remains
actively disinterested in the role that broader
forms of social transformation can play in facil-
itating and shaping behaviour change (John,
2018: 10).
At this point it is important to consider the
connections and parallels that exist between
neuroliberalism and perhaps the most signifi-
cant critical theory of behavioural government
of the last decade: governmentality. Theories of
neoliberal governmentality have already been
deployed in order to develop critical perspec-
tives on the systems of behavioural government
that are associated with neuroliberalism (see
Jones et al., 2011). It is our contention that as
a distinctly liberal system of government, which
seeks to govern (at both an individual and pop-
ulation level) in and through systems of per-
sonal freedom, neuroliberalism embodies an
adapted form of neoliberal governmentality
(Foucault, 2008 [2004]; 2007 [2004]). As a
regime of governmentality, neuroliberalism
also reflects the continuing desire to provide
forms of biopolitical care for a population (Fou-
cault, 2008 [2004]).4 It is, however, now well
established that neoliberal governmentality is a
system of government that seeks to ‘minimize
costs and maximize profits’ (Cook, 2016: 142).
The minimization of costs is, in part, achieved
on the basis of a reduced role for governments
within the provision of collective forms of wel-
fare. The maximization of profits is secured
within neoliberal governmentality on the basis
of individuals taking ever greater responsibility
for reflective forms of self-government, and
personal improvement, which enhance both
their productivity and wellbeing (Rose, 1999).
It is on these terms of reference that neuroliber-
alism expands the potential scope of inquiry
associated with neoliberal governmentality.
First, neuroliberalism raises questions about
neoliberal assumptions that individuals can
effectively self-govern through systems of
reflexive rationality. In this context, neuroliber-
alism supports the further development of the-
ories of governmentality that consider how
irrationality becomes an object of self-
governing reflectivity, and a target for new sys-
tems of biopolitical government. Second, and in
the context of the Credit Crunch and Great
Recession, neuroliberal perspectives question
whether a non-interventionist state is actually
cost effective within society. To these ends, the
critical theory of neuroliberalism proposed in
this paper builds on established concerns within
theories of governmentality, but also seeks to
draw particular attention to how the governing
of irrational behaviours is being informed by
new theories of both the self and the state.
III Neuroliberalism in critical
geographical perspective: Context
and spatial representations of
irrationality
In one of the most detailed discussions of the
relationship between geography and beha-
vioural economics, Kendra Strauss explores the
creative overlaps that exist between (economic)
geography and neuroliberal theories of human
nature (Strauss, 2008). Strauss’s analysis is
interesting because it not only considers the util-
ity of incorporating behavioural economics into
geography, but also why this process has been
so ponderously pursued. According to Strauss,
behavioural economists’ assault on the rational-
ity assumption of neo-classical economics mir-
rors behavioural geography’s attempts to
‘humanize the economic’ in the early 1970s
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(2008: 137–8). The fact that behavioural geo-
graphy has subsequently been rejected within
critical economic geography – in favour of more
socially and culturally embedded accounts of
economic activity – has, however, made it dif-
ficult for an effective dialogue to be established
between geography and the neuroliberal
sciences. Strauss claims that the insights of
behavioural economics could now be used to
draw renewed (and nuanced) attention to beha-
viour at a time when critical economic geogra-
phy has lost sight of the individual (2008: 138).
In what remains of this paper, we consider the
potential for establishing a dialogue between
various strands of critical geography and neuro-
liberal inquiry, and the potential contributions
that geography could make to the development
of a critical theory of neuroliberalism.
1 Neuroliberalism and the problem of
context
One of the key nexus points between geography
and neuroliberal thought is the notion of con-
text. Context matters in neuroliberal thought in
two main ways. First, the behavioural subject at
the heart of the neuroliberal project is one that is
inherently context dependent. Unlike homo eco-
nomicus, who exists in a form of frictionless
space and of desert-island like isolation, the
neuroliberal subject’s gestalt is contextual
(Cohen, 2014) (although, as we argue below,
neuroliberalism deploys an ultimately thin
understanding of context). The neuroliberal cit-
izen’s behaviour is seen to be shaped by social
context (and in particular peer pressure and herd
instincts), material environments, decision-
making frames, and the general push of the
world around them (Kahneman, 2012). Second,
context is the primary vector for neuroliberal
attempts to change and regulate human beha-
viour (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Conse-
quently, through the careful development and
orchestration of choice architectures in every-
day environments of various kinds (including
school canteens, doctors’ surgeries, streets, and
staircases), neuroliberalism pursues beha-
vioural government not by changing the subject
directly, but by subtly altering the surrounding
world (as a route to ultimately changing beha-
viour). Neuroliberalism’s focus on context –
and in particular the notion of choice architec-
tures and environments – not only reflects the
epistemological assumptions of emerging beha-
vioural insights but is central to the political
orientation of the neuroliberal project (see Sun-
stein, 2014). Changing contexts in order to
change behaviours is politically significant to
neuroliberalists to the extent that it enables them
to preserve the liberal values of personal free-
dom and choice: while the behavioural context
may change, the opportunity for personal auton-
omy remains (Sunstein, 2014).
A concern with context has also been a defin-
ing characteristic of geographical inquiry since
the inception of the discipline. Geographers
routinely embrace the methodological mission
of contextualizing more generalized insights
concerning the nature of power, knowledge, and
being within space. More specifically, the con-
textual approach within geography has consis-
tently sought to interpret social life through an
ontological commitment to the world as a series
of evolving connections between people and
things in space and time (Simonsen, 1991).
According to Strauss (2009), although beha-
vioural economists have sought to build more
holistic and contextually oriented accounts of
decision-making (which includes intuition,
emotion, and imagination inter alia), their epis-
temological and methodological assumptions
tend to critically limit ‘the theorization of the
context of decision making’ (p. 303). Strauss
goes so far as to say that, within behavioural
economics at least, ‘context itself is underdeter-
mined and remains largely untheorized’ (2008:
143). In order to better understanding the limita-
tions of the contextual interpretations associated
with neuroliberalism it is instructive to consider
an example of neuroliberalism in (contextual)
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practice. An appropriate example is provided by
Carter’s analysis of the fusing of nudges and
neoliberalism in the US Blue Zones initiative.
According to Carter, the Blue Zone Project
‘is a placed-based, community centred, and
commercial health promotion enterprise’ that
has been implemented in a growing number of
US states and cities (2015: 374).5 The Blue
Zones project is based on the assumption that
if we spend 90% of our time in the same every-
day places, changing these places, and what we
do in them, is central to living a healthy life
(Blue Zone Project, 2017). At the heart of the
project is the desire to transform places in such a
way that it becomes easier to be healthy. The
Blue Zone project reflects a geographical
expression of neuroliberalism to the extent that
it uses small environmental adaptations so as to
gently bias context in order to promote beha-
viours that support good physical and mental
health (Carter, 2015: 375–6). A central vision
within this neuroliberal environmental strategy
is to deconvenience everyday spaces (2015:
377). The Blue Zones Project’s contextual strat-
egy involves ‘[cities] build[ing] more side-
walks; citizens pledg[ing] to ‘“deconvenience”
their lives, for example by walking more and
using shovels instead of snowblowers; school
cafeterias, supermarkets, and restaurants were
persuaded to offer healthier menu items [ . . . ]’
(2015: 377). The Blue Zone Project uses neuro-
liberal tactics in two key ways: (1) it targets
environmental contexts as the basis for beha-
vioural government; (2) in seeking to enable
people to ‘mindlessly move [their] way to better
health’ (Blue Zone LLC, 2013) it targets the
human unconscious (Jones et al., 2013).
Carter develops an interesting, contextually-
oriented critique of this particular form of neu-
roliberal programme. According to Carter:
BZP [Blue Zone Project] promotes a thoroughly
desocialized discourse about creating healthy
communities. The BZP assiduously avoids con-
templation of thorny structural determinants of
health, such as income and wealth, educational
attainment, employment status, or race and ethni-
city. (2015: 380)
Carter’s critique suggests that while neurolib-
eral policies re-contextualize human behaviour
in certain ways (particularly with regard to the
development of local physical infrastructures
and community norms), they continue to decon-
textualize it in other ways (specifically class,
race and ethnic relations). Carter’s analysis
resonates with other critiques of neuroliberal
policies (see Jones et al., 2013; Strauss, 2008,
2009). What these geographical critiques have
in common is that they recognize neuroliberal-
ism’s attempts to re-contextualize behavioural
problems (such as health), while they also draw
attention to the broader neoliberal tendency to
de-socialize understanding of these issues.
Carter’s analysis of the shortcomings of neu-
roliberalism has much in common with
Strauss’s (2009) attempts to build a contextually
based rapprochement between geography and
behavioural economics. According to Strauss,
while behavioural economics (and by extension
neuroliberalism) supports a fairly anaemic con-
textual perspective:
[a] geographical conception of context as the
decision-making environment encapsulates
the permeable and mutable scales implicated in
the decision-making ‘moment’. Thus, the articu-
lation of space and place as part of the conceptual
working through of the notion of context must
include the scalar range of individual experience:
from the individual to the global, from the inti-
mate to the distanced, from embodied to disem-
bodied forms of experience. (2009: 308–9)
Strauss thus asserts the importance of incor-
porating an appreciation of processes that oper-
ate at multiple contextual scales (including
embodied experience, physical locality, com-
pany practices, national policies, and global
financial markets) (2009: 308–9). Geographers
have similarly argued that more attention
should be paid to where these contextual scales
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meet – connecting situated and embodied prac-
tices with the geo-historical contextual ration-
alities in which the neurosciences have emerged
as dominant explanatory frames for a range of
social and policy phenomena (Pykett, 2015).
Crucially, this perspective (in keeping with Car-
ter’s) does not suggest that neuroliberal insights
(particularly at the level of human cognition of
choice environment) are not of value to geogra-
phical enquiry but that, on their own, they can
only offer limited forms of explanation for
human conduct (and its capacity to be
governed).
From this perspective, it is instructive to con-
sider the more specific connections and diver-
gences that exist between neuroliberalism and
geographical approaches to context. A helpful
point of departure for this endeavour is Simon-
sen’s (1991) geographical analysis of the con-
textuality of human action and life. In her
attempt to reinvigorate the notion of context
within geographical inquiry, Simonsen counters
overly structuralist accounts of human life by
introducing more subjectively oriented interpre-
tations of action. Drawing on broadly Lefebv-
rian and Giddensian frameworks of social time
and space, Simonsen identifies three dimen-
sions of contextual temporality: longue dure´e
(best understood in relation to trans-
generational forms and institutions); lifespan;
and the dure´e of daily life (in particular routines
and habits) (1991: 427). Paralleling these,
Simonsen proposes three aspects of contextual
spatiality: institutional spatial practices
(namely the structural and collective production
of space); place (the sphere of the human attach-
ment of meaning to space and the conscious
appropriation of the surrounding environment);
and individual spatial practice (the zone of spa-
tialized habits, physical presence, and routine
interaction) (1991: 428). Crucially, Simonsen
claims that it is at the intersection of these dif-
ferent dimensions of context that the ‘concrete
production of social individuals’ occurs (1991:
429). To put things perhaps more simply, it is
not so much that individual action is condi-
tioned by context, but that subjectivity (in both
its conscious and unconscious forms) is itself a
product of contextuality.
Neuroliberal approaches to temporal context
tend to ignore the longue dure´e concerns that
frame human action. The possible exception to
this is the neuroliberal interest in social norms.
While social norms could be interpreted as
inter-generational contextual phenomena, they
tend to be approached within neuroliberalism as
relatively recent and highly malleable social
conditions. Neuroliberal policies do display
some sensitivity to the lifespan dynamics of
context, particularly in relation to recognizing
how particular moments in life (such as moving
home, having your first child, or going to col-
lege) provide opportunities for behavioural
modification; or how our inability to effectively
relate to our future selves prevents effective
planning for our future needs. The sensitivity
to lifespan displayed by neuroliberal policies
tends, however, to focus more on how our bio-
graphy provides opportunities for isolated beha-
vioural prompts (i.e. life-stage interventions),
rather than recognizing how lifespan experi-
ences shape our behavioural orientations in
more continuous ways. Neuroliberal
approaches to temporal context tend to focus
predominantly on the dure´e of daily life where
our habits, routines, and customs become the
target of behavioural interventions. Critically,
however, neuroliberalism’s concern with the
temporalities of daily life (from commuting to
work to our bedtime cycles) tends to ignore the
ways in which these behavioural patterns are an
emerging part of the unfurling of inter-
generational and lifespan contexts.
In relationship to the key dimensions of spa-
tial context, neuroliberalism tends to underesti-
mate the institutional spatial practices that
shape geography over relatively long periods
of time and over large spatial scales. Neurolib-
eral government’s lack of concern with institu-
tional spatial practices is demonstrated most
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clearly by its tendency to assume the ease with
which space can be transformed, and a predis-
position to focus on changing choice architec-
tures at relatively small scales. Neuroliberalism
has a somewhat duplicitous relationship with
the contextual power of place. As evidenced
in the discussion of the Blue Zone Project
above, neuroliberalism’s emphasis on the cre-
ation of unconscious environmental cues to
action tends to mean it downplays the signifi-
cance of conscious social attachments to place
(Carter, 2015). In other iterations, however,
neuroliberal policies actively engage in the
production of visibly meaningful places (in
direct contrast to the ubiquitous non-spaces
of modernity) as prompts for certain forms
of behavioural action (this is particularly evi-
dent in policies which target anti-social beha-
viour of different kinds) (see Jones et al.
(2013) for an analysis of the DIY Streets
movement in the UK). The primary spatial
focus of neuroliberalism’s contextual strate-
gies is the sphere of individual spatial prac-
tice. When combined with its focus on the
dure´e of daily life, this means that neuroli-
beralism’s contextual project tends to focus
on the most proximate spatial and temporal
determinants of human conduct.
There are several key insights that can be
gained from a consideration of neuroliberalist
contextual assumptions. The first is that within
neuroliberalism context tends to be used as a
tool of behavioural government and not as a
hermeneutic framework for behavioural
inquiry. This is precisely why we see such a
strong contextual focus on the micro times and
spaces of daily life and individual spatial prac-
tice. When neuroliberalism does concern itself
with meso-level contextual horizons, such as
lifespans and place-formations, it tends to do
so in order to change short-term conduct, and
not to better understand longer-term drivers of
human action. Neuroliberalism’s lack of con-
cern with macro-level contextual considerations
is significant not only because of the clear
epistemological lacuna it generates, but also
because of what it tells us about the political
orientation of the project – and its likely effi-
cacy as a system of behavioural government.
Politically it signals the relatively conformist
nature (neuroliberalists prefer the term radical
incrementalism) of the neuroliberal project, as it
ignores key strategic and structural determi-
nants of social life. According to Simonsen, ‘the
problem of contextuality is closely related to the
problem of the mediation between structure and
agency’ (1991: 43). Neuroliberalism’s focus on
the micro-contexts of life does not just mean
that it underestimates the power of more-than-
local forces in conditioning human agency, but
that it overemphasizes the agency of govern-
ment projects to meaningful shape conduct
through context.
This paper asserts that the theorization of
context is one of the key contributions that
geography and geographers can make to crit-
ical analyses of neuroliberalism. Ultimately,
this could lead to a more radical recasting of
how we understand the relationship between
human behaviour and context that challenges
simplistic depictions of behaviour as isolated
moments that can be easily ascribed to dis-
crete actors. According to the work of Strauss
(2008, 2009), however, context offers more
than a route for critical geographical scrutiny
of neuroliberal government. Context can also
offer an interdisciplinary conduit through
which emerging psychological insights into
human cognition can enlighten geographical
inquiry, while geographical concerns with
time and space can inform neuroliberalism.
For Strauss, this interdisciplinary project is
about more than a theoretical dialogue, it is
also a basis to promote multi-method studies
of cognition and context, as the logical deduc-
tive experimentalism of psychology is fused
with the forms of quantitative and qualitative
methods that support geographical inquiry
into multi-scalar contexts (Strauss, 2008:
312; see also Clark et al., 2012).
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2 Neuroliberalism and the geographical
representations of irrationality
The previous section focused on the ways in
which neuroliberalism situates human beha-
viour at the interface of our cognitive limita-
tions and contextual circumstances. This
section focuses on another key, if often implicit,
geographical dimension of neuroliberal thought
and action: the geographical representations of
irrationality. While the contextual drivers of
human irrationality are openly discussed within
neuroliberal discourse, neuroliberalism carries
with it generally unacknowledged assumptions
about the spatialization of irrationality. These
spatial imaginaries of irrationality often invoke
notions of backwardness and marginality
(Berndt, 2015; Jones et al., 2013). Moreover,
neuroliberal geographical imaginations of the
irrational often also carry with them assump-
tions concerning the normative value of market
integration and compliance (Boeckler and
Berndt, 2012). Focusing on the application of
neuroliberalism within international develop-
ment policy, and building on the work of the
economic geographer Christian Berndt, this sec-
tion explores the fusing of geographical imagi-
nations with neuroliberal visions of the
irrational.
Various strands of international development
policies are displaying the hallmarks of neuro-
liberalist thinking and action. Recent research
has revealed that prominent international devel-
opment organizations including USAID, UNI-
CEF, EuropeAid, the WHO, UNESCO, the
United Nations Development Programme, and
AusAid are utilizing neuroliberal styles of pol-
icy to support their international development
work (Whitehead et al., 2014). This research has
revealed that related initiatives have been
applied in a wide range of policy areas, includ-
ing the promotion of fertilizer use, public health
initiatives (particularly those combating HIV/
AIDs and diarrhoea), and various saving and
investment schemes (Whitehead et al., 2014).
A key moment in the emergence of a neurolib-
eral international development policy regime
was the publication of the World Bank’s 2015
World Development Report, Mind, Society and
Behaviour. This report directly challenges the
neoclassical rationality assumptions that
formed a crucial part of the Bank’s neoliberal
past and suggests ways in which the insights of
the behavioural and psychological sciences
could be applied to a range of development
issues including poverty alleviation, early child-
hood development, and climate change mitiga-
tion (World Bank, 2015: 4–5).
What is particularly interesting about emer-
ging neuroliberal development policies are the
ways in which they creatively fuse psychologi-
cal insights into the nature of human irrational-
ity with imaginations of space and assumptions
about market processes. The recent work of
Berndt has focused specific attention on these
interconnected themes (see Berndt, 2015; see
also Boeckler and Berndt, 2012). Berndt has
studied key international policy documents pro-
duced by the World Bank, OECD, and FAO,
which seek to apply the insights of behavioural
economics to anti-poverty initiatives in rural
settings. We believe that the appropriate ela-
boration of Berndt’s work has significant impli-
cations for the development of a geographically
informed critical theory of neuroliberalism.
At the centre of Berndt’s analysis is a recog-
nition of the different comprehensions of the
impoverished citizen that characterize neolib-
eral and neuroliberal world views. Neoliberal
development policies treat those in poverty as
if they have nothing behaviourally special about
them: namely, that they can perform their role as
rational actors within systems of market
exchange as competently (or indeed incompe-
tently) as the wealthy (2015: 577). Neuroliber-
alism (and the behavioural economic research it
is often based upon) suggests, however, that ‘the
poor’ are marked by distinctive behavioural
shortcomings, that are a product of the cognitive
toll that impoverishment places upon them.
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These neuroliberal assumptions are clearly evi-
denced in the World Bank’s Mind, Society and
Behaviour report. The Report states that
‘[w]hen individuals are under cognitive strain,
it is even more difficult to activate the delibera-
tive system. Poverty, time pressure, and finan-
cial stress all can cause cognitive strain’ (World
Bank, 2015: 27).
In order to demonstrate the cognitive limita-
tions associated with poverty, the World Bank
discusses the example of sugar cane farmers in
India. The Bank reflects on cognitive tests that
were carried out on these farmers before and
after harvest periods: with pre-harvest periods
being associated with the accumulation of debt
and immediate post-harvest periods associated
with an easing of financial strain (2015: 27; see
also Mani et al., 2013). These tests revealed that
not only did the farmers perform less well in
cognitive processes during periods of poverty,
but that the difference in scores between pre-
and post-harvest performance was roughly the
same as three-quarters of the deficit that an indi-
vidual accrues when they lose a whole night’s
sleep (2015: 27). Neuroliberal solutions to such
cognitive problems revolve around the use of
psychological devices that can make it easier
for farmers to act in their own long-term inter-
ests, even when their immediate impoverish-
ment makes this difficult. The World Bank
thus supports the use of framing, anchoring,
re-setting defaults, simplification techniques,
and peer pressure within development policies
related to the promotion of fertilizer use, loan
products, and agricultural investment (World
Bank, 2015: 26–75).
It is reasonable to assert that the particular
psychological costs of poverty are now well-
established within development economics and
policy-making (see Mullainathan and Shafir,
2013). While acknowledging the behavioural
problems that are generated by poverty may
be a welcome challenge to neo-classical
assumptions, there are political and ideological
dangers that reside in the connections that are
being forged between irrationality and poverty.
Exposing the links between irrationality and
poverty can often result in subtle shifts in the
equations of causality that connect these two
conditions. It is thus one thing to recognize that
poverty produces forms of irrationality (which
can perpetuate poverty in the long term), but it is
quite another to assume that the neuroliberal
mitigation of irrationality is enough to tackle
the longer-term contextual drivers of global
poverty. Berndt describes this policy change
as ‘a shift of attention from the market to the
market subject, that is from market failure to
behavioural failure, and from market regulation
to behavioural engineering’ (2015: 569).
It is our contention that the emerging connec-
tions that are being made between poverty and
irrationality open up the possibility for a distinc-
tively geographical critique of neuroliberal pov-
erty alleviation policies. According to Berndt,
behavioural policies are producing new geogra-
phical imaginations of irrationality which,
rather than questioning the operation of mar-
kets, are able to reaffirm markets as the solution
to enduring regimes of poverty (2015: 584).
Berndt asserts that these geographical represen-
tations of irrationality see:
On the one side [ . . . ] the ‘poor’, reduced to ‘indi-
genous’, ‘local’ and ‘traditional’ knowledge,
populating a world characterized by small scale
and traditional agriculture. On the other side we
have ‘the non-poor’, trained and educated,
involved in large-scale production using sophisti-
cated farming methods. On the one side are poor
small-holders, on the other entrepreneurial farm-
ers. Dualist representations like this are particu-
larly strong the closer ones get to the
implementation stage. (2015: 579)
Such representations of irrationality see neu-
roliberalism take an overt geographical form,
with certain (non-market oriented) places
becoming associated with forms of indigenous
irrationality, while other, more entrepreneurial,
locations are seen as bastions of reason. Such
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geographical imaginations are in manyways not
so much neuroliberal as neurocolonial, to the
extent that they not only connect poverty with
irrationality but ‘traditional societies’ with a
lack of reasoning capacity. It does appear that
the World Bank is wary of neuroliberalism
becoming neurocolonial. They consistently
emphasize that the cognitive limitations identi-
fied within neuroliberal sciences are as much a
feature of World Bank staff as those that they
work with (2015: 4). At the same time, however,
the report emphasizes the persistent inabilities
of development professionals to grasp the men-
tal models of the poor (2015: 180–90).
What is most significant about neuroliberal-
ism’s emerging geographical imagery is what it
tells us about the spatial assumptions of such
policies. While the distasteful neurocolonialism
of such representations may catch the attention,
this can distract from the epistemological work
that such imaginaries do. It is not just that neu-
roliberalism appears to equate irrationality with
local, traditional and indigenous spaces, but it
suggests that these spaces actively inhibit cog-
nitive development. According to Berndt, many
neuroliberal policies are predicated on the
assumption that it is because these spaces do not
expose inhabitants to market forces that ration-
ality is unable to develop (Berndt, 2015: 581).
This reveals an assumed geographical bounding
of rationality. The notion of the geographical
bounding of rationality adds a problematic spa-
tial dimension to the concept of bounded ration-
ality that emerged at the beginning of the
neuroliberal project (Strauss, 2008). The geo-
graphical bounding of irrationality in this way
serves important political and economic pur-
poses. First, it disconnects evident irrationality
and poverty in one place from the impacts of
market development in another. From a critical
geographical perspective, this fails to recognize
the uneven geographies of economic develop-
ment that emphasize the necessary connections
between market success in one place, and
under-development in another. Second, it
asserts that the solution to the problems associ-
ated with the spaces of impoverished irrational-
ity is exposure to market forces. In addition to
representing a form of structural adjustment
policy operating at a neurological level, this
assertion makes troubling assumptions about
the very nature of rationality. Equating ration-
ality with market-oriented reasoning not only
denies the possibility that reason may be found
in non-market oriented actions (such as recipro-
city and care giving), it also fails to recognize
how irrational actions can actually reflect sen-
sible adaptive responses to particular circum-
stances (Gigerenzer, 2014).
Ultimately, the emerging connections that
are being made between international develop-
ment policies and understandings of irrational-
ity signal critical contributions that geographers
can make to the analysis of the spatial imagin-
aries of neuroliberalism. These are contribu-
tions that not only draw attention to emerging
patterns of neurocolonialism but also the geo-
graphical bounding of rationality. To these
ends, geographers can play an important role
in exposing the arbitrary assumptions concern-
ing reason, irrationality, and market forces that
often flow from neuroliberal discourse.
IV Conclusion
This paper has had two primary aims. First, it
has proposed and unpacked the notion of neu-
roliberalism as a context for analysing emerging
forms of behavioural government. Second, it
has explored the particular contributions that
geography can make to the critical analysis of
neuroliberalism and the systems of psychologi-
cal power with which it has become associated.
In relation to the first aim of this paper, our
analysis has outlined the main ways in which
neuroliberalism could contribute to the study
of emerging systems of behavioural govern-
ment. In one context, neuroliberalism offers an
integrative framework for connecting together a
series of scientific insights and governmental
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techniques through which it is becoming
increasingly common to use psychological tech-
niques to govern people in free societies. The
integrative potential of neuroliberalism repre-
sents an important starting point in attempts to
try to make sense of the proliferation of new
strategies for behavioural government. In
another context, it has been proposed that a crit-
ical theory of neuroliberalism could offer a
valuable context in and through which to ana-
lyse emerging systems of behavioural govern-
ment. Developing a critical theory of
neuroliberalism appears to be particularly sig-
nificant given the ethical issues that related
practices raise, and the lack of metaphysical
perspective that is evident within the sciences
of neuroliberalism. The policies associated with
neuroliberal styles of government often cele-
brate their lack of abstraction and assert their
pragmatic orientation. A critical theory of neu-
roliberalism can, however, help to expose the
likely practical failings of such systems of gov-
ernment, as well as revealing their conformist
inability to address engrained forms of uneven
development and injustice.
In relation to the second aim of this paper, our
analysis has introduced existing work that has
sought to connect geographical concerns with
neuroliberal processes. Particular attention has
been drawn to the questions of context and geo-
graphical representations of irrationality. The
analysis presented here reveals that while neu-
roliberalism is a contextually oriented project,
its mobilizations of contextual factors ignore
(inadvertently or otherwise) long-term temporal
issues and large-scale spatial processes.
Through a consideration of existing analyses
of neuroliberal policies for international devel-
opment, this paper has also explored an appar-
ent lack of awareness of the forms of
geographical representations they promote, and
the neurocolonial and neuro-responsibilizing
undercurrents they support. What unites these
critical geographical perspectives on context
and spatial representation is that they reveal the
ways in which geography, in particular, plays a
crucial role in enabling neuroliberalists to jus-
tify their actions on the basis of the failures of
markets, only to use their policies to promote
market norms.
Ultimately, this paper proposes that the
notion of neuroliberalism offers geographers a
novel perspective on emerging forms of psycho-
logical power and potentially valuable insights
into human motivation and action. Furthermore,
we claim that geographers have much to offer
evaluative and critical interpretations of neuro-
liberalism. It appears likely in the combined
wake of the crises of neoliberalism, and the
enduring power of market systems, that neuro-
liberalism (in various forms and guises) is going
to grow in influence. In this context, we believe
that geographers have a particularly important
role to play in exposing the spatial limitations
and contradictions of the neuroliberal project.
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Notes
1. The work of this team was bolstered by the Presidential
Executive Order – Using Behavioral Science Insights to
Better Serve the American People. This Executive
Order that was issued by Barack Obama in 2015 com-
pels federal agencies to fully realize the benefits of
behavioural insights.
2. Drawing on Horney’s (1991 [1950]) theories of neuro-
sis, Isin’s work had two primary goals. First, he draws
attention to the role of certain forms of emotions,
desires and affects within the orchestration of govern-
mental power. Second, and mobilizing Horney’s more
sociologically oriented theory of neurosis, Isin explored
the broader political and economic origins of emotional
power, and thus challenged the narrow exploration of
anxiety that was common within the psychological and
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the neurological sciences (see Greco and Stenner,
2013).
3. The full transcripts of some of these interviews, and
related interview schedules and ethical consent forms,
are available to download at the UK Data Service:
http://reshare.ukdataservice.ac.uk/851870/
4. It is interesting to note that in his 1978 lecture series at
the Colle`ge de France, entitled ‘The Birth of Biopoli-
tics’, Foucault anticipated a form of neuroliberal govern-
mentality (Foucault, 2008 [2004]: 268–71). According
to Foucault, the emerging realization within neoliberal
economics in the 1960s that the body of actions defined
as ‘irrational’ actually reflects a surprisingly predictable
set of non-random acts had significant implications for
how it might be possible to govern liberal societies (pp.
269–70). Foucault essentially discerns within the eco-
nomic study of irrationality the potential for a newmodel
of psychologically imbued neoliberal governmentality
that would emerge 30 years later (p. 270).
5. The title Blue Zones comes from Dan Buettner’s 2008
book Blue Zones. In this book Blue Zones refer to those
places in the world – such as Sardinia and Okinawa –
where life expectancy is on averagemuch higher than the
rest of the world (the colour blue is significant here only
to the extent that it is the colour that he used to mark out
these ‘longevity hotspots’ on maps; Carter, 2015: 376).
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